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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4034 
_____________ 
 
THE MICHAEL S. RULLE FAMILY DYNASTY TRUST, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
AGL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY 
_____________ 
 
On appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00231) 
District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 14, 2011 
 
BEFORE: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 11, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
The Michael S. Rulle Family Dynasty Trust (“Rulle Trust”) appeals from the 
District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of its amended complaint.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm.   
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I. 
We write primarily for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to 
reach our decision.  Rulle Trust filed this action as a result of losses suffered in 
connection with a Flexible Premium Variable Life Insurance Contract (the “Policy” or 
“Contract”) issued by AGL Life Assurance Company (“AGL”) and distributed through 
Phoenix Equity Planning Corporation (“Phoenix Equity”), as broker-dealer.  Michael S. 
Rulle (“Rulle”), the named insured on the Policy, is an experienced investment banker.  
The terms of the Policy are governed by Alaska law.  
The Policy offered Rulle Trust the opportunity to invest its premiums in either a 
money market account or a “fund of funds” established by AGL called American Masters 
Opportunity Insurance Fund, LLC, and later renamed Tremont Opportunity Fund III, L.P. 
(“Tremont Fund”), a Delaware Partnership managed by Tremont Partners, Inc. 
(“Tremont”).  A document entitled the “AGL Life Assurance Company Private 
Placement Memorandum” (“AGL PPM”) explained the details of these two options.   
John Hillman—the Director, President and CEO of AGL, and a licensed broker under the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Association (“FINRA”)—solicited Rulle Trust to invest 
the Policy premiums in the Tremont Fund.  Hillman represented to Rulle Trust that the 
Tremont Fund was highly diversified, and that the investor “would be as far removed 
from making investment decisions as possible.”  (App. 602).   Hillman also allegedly told 
Rulle Trust that no more than 7% of its investment from the Policy would be placed in 
the hands of any single investment manager.  In October 2001, Rulle Trust elected to 
invest all of its insurance premiums from the Policy in the Tremont Fund.  Tremont 
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subsequently distributed Rulle Trust’s premiums into various hedge funds, including four 
funds operated by Bernard Madoff.  As a result, Rulle Trust became one of the many 
victims of Madoff’s infamous Ponzi scheme when it was exposed in December 2008.  
When Madoff’s fraud was exposed, the estimated 23% of Rulle Trust’s premiums that 
had been invested with Madoff lost their entire value.    
Rulle Trust filed suit against AGL, asserting eight claims: (1) breach of contract, 
(2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, (4) federal securities fraud, (5) fraud under the Alaska and Pennsylvania 
Securities Acts, (6) professional negligence, negligence, and gross negligence, (7) 
negligent misrepresentation, and (8) unjust enrichment.    The District Court ultimately 
dismissed all eight causes of action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).   
Rulle Trust now brings this timely appeal.1
II. 
   
Rulle Trust first argues that AGL breached the terms of the Policy by improperly 
valuing the Tremont Fund account to include the losses from Madoff’s fraud and by 
failing to meet its diversification expectations.  Absent ambiguous language, the meaning 
of a contract is interpreted as a matter of law, Keffer v. Keffer, 852 P.2d 394, 397 (Alaska 
1993), and “the plain language” controls. Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1222 
(Alaska 2005).  Here, the language in the Policy and AGL PPM is unambiguous and thus 
                                                 
1The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The U.S. Dept. of Transp., ex rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g, 
564 F.3d 673, 676 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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controlling.   The AGL PPM explicitly states that “[t]he [P]olicy owner bears the entire 
investment risk for all amounts invested in the [P]olicy, including the risk of loss of 
principal.  There is no guaranteed minimum account value.”  (App. 146) (emphasis 
omitted).   The AGL PPM further provides “no guarantee of future performance and … 
no assurance that the Partnership will be able to achieve its investment objectives or be 
profitable.”  (App. 183) (emphasis omitted).   The Policy also states that the value of 
Rulle Trust’s account will fluctuate in accordance with the value of the investment 
accounts into which it was invested.  (App. 77). 
The District Court correctly determined that preceding language unambiguously 
places the “entire” risk of investing the Policy premiums in the Tremont Fund on Rulle 
Trust, and does not make AGL an insurer of that risk.  Further, although a contract may 
be rescinded and restitution awarded under Alaska law where a material 
misrepresentation induced a party to enter into the contract, Cousineau v. Walker, 613 
P.2d 608, 611-12 & n.5 (Alaska 1980), the breach of contract count of the amended 
complaint nowhere mentions rescission.  
Further,  while it is true that “[e]very contract in Alaska includes an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 
844 (Alaska 2010), the amended complaint’s allegations that this duty was breached 
consists entirely of its contention that AGL failed to perform in accordance with the 
terms of the Policy.  Yet we have already affirmed the District Court’s ruling that Rulle 
Trust fails to state a claim for breach of contract.  Thus, its claim that AGL violated the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing must fail as well. 
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Rulle Trust also failed to adequately plead a federal or state securities fraud claim.  
“To establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant acted with scienter, a ‘mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.’”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 
(2007) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976)).  None of the 
allegations in the amended complaint give rise to a plausible claim that AGL’s alleged 
statements or omissions knowingly or recklessly misled Rulle Trust under the heightened 
pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”).  Inst. Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252, 267 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Specifically, the amended complaint does not allege how or why AGL should have 
known or discovered that 23% of Rulle Trust’s premiums would ultimately be invested 
with one manager by the Tremont Fund, a separate entity.  It thus fails to specifically and 
plausibly allege recklessness. 
As both the Alaska and Pennsylvania Securities Acts2
Rulle Trust next argues that AGL owed it a fiduciary duty or duty of care because 
it retained exclusive control over all aspects of Rulle Trust’s invested premiums and had 
 have been interpreted to 
include similar scienter requirements as the Federal Securities Laws, Rulle Trust’s state 
securities claims fail for the same reason.  See Leder v. Shinfeld, 609 F.Supp.2d 386, 395 
(E.D. Pa. 2009); Alaska Stat. § 45.55.010(a) (West 2010).   
                                                 
2 Although the question of whether Alaska or Pennsylvania law applies to the remaining state 
law claims was not definitively determined by the District Court, because we find the results to 
be the same under the law of either state, we decline to undertake a full choice of law analysis for 
any of these remaining claims. 
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the sole contact and communication with Tremont.  However, we agree with the District 
Court that AGL did not maintain control , let alone exclusive control over Rulle Trust’s 
premiums.  Rather, Rulle Trust was clearly informed that its investment would be 
managed solely by Tremont, who would be entirely responsible for deciding the funds 
and managers with which to invest.  Further, AGL did not owe Rulle Trust a duty by 
virtue of its status as an insurance provider, or because it gave Rulle Trust investment 
advice.  As the District Court correctly noted, this case did not involve an insurance 
dispute; nor did AGL enter into or adopt the role of a broker-dealer, investment manager, 
or investment advisor relationship with Rulle Trust.  This is especially true given Rulle’s 
sophisticated financial background, and the large, arm’s length deal that was at issue.  
Finally, Rulle Trust’s claim of unjust enrichment fails under both Pennsylvania 
and Alaska law.  Although Rulle Trust argues that the alleged management fees AGL 
received were “improper,” given the absence of plausible allegations that AGL insured 
Rulle Trust’s risk, or had some duty with regards to Rulle Trust’s investment in the 
Tremont Fund, we agree with the District Court that the amended complaint fails to plead 
anything improper that would support a plausible claim for unjust enrichment. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasoning of the District Court in its 
thorough and persuasive written opinion, we will affirm the District Court’s orders 
dismissing Rulle Trust’s amended complaint.     
